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Abstract 
 
On Thursday June 23rd, 2016, a majority of the UK electorate voted in favour of leaving the 
EU by a margin of 51.9% to 48.1%. Throughout the night, as the results were reported, the 
media spoke about London, Scotland and Northern Ireland versus the rest of country in 
regard to their support for the EU. In this commentary, I look at the geographical distribution 
of the share of the Leave votes and model it against the share of the electorate, by local 
authority and by region, using a multilevel framework. The model identifies both differences 
between countries and differences between regions but also more localised variations that 
depart from those trends. Areas with an older population were more likely to attract a higher 
share of the Leave vote, as were those with higher proportions of residents in lower 
supervisory and technical occupations and with residents born outside of the UK but in the 
EU. The referendum has revealed a less than United Kingdom, with notable differences 
between Scotland, Northern Ireland and much of London, and parts of the East Midlands, 
West Midlands and the East. However, London is not as pro-EU as might be anticipated 
given its social, ethnic and demographic composition, which may help explain why the Leave 
campaign won with a small margin. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“A nation divided” (Headline of the i newspaper, Friday June 24, 2016) 
 
On Thursday June 23rd, 2016, a majority of the UK electorate voted in favour of leaving the 
European Union (EU) by a slight margin of 51.9% to 48.1%. Throughout the night, as the 
results were reported, the media spoke in terms of London, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
versus the rest of country, as the Remain campaign made lower than expected headway in 
other regions. 
 
The UK was not a founder member of what was the European Economic Community (EEC) 
but joined as one of eight other countries in 1973. A referendum on continued membership 
took place in 1975, with 67 per cent of those who voted in favour of it. Since that time the EU 
has expanded to 28 member states. Historically the Labour Party (one of the two largest 
parties in the UK electoral system) has been the more Eurosceptic and it was two 
Conservative Prime Ministers, Edward Heath and then John Major, who took the UK into the 
EEC and signed the Maastricht Treaty (for a more economically and politically integrated 
EU). However, Major’s Premiership was characterised by considerable Conservative 
infighting about Europe, whereas ‘New Labour’ under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown was 
generally pro-Europe. The decision by the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, to hold the 
referendum was partly a response to the electoral successes of the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP, founded in 1991 as the Anti-Federalist League) which won the largest share of the 
votes for England, Scotland and Wales in the 2014 European election (27.5 per cent, an 
increase of 11 percentage points from the 2009 election) and came third by vote share in the 
2015 UK General Election (12.6 per cent, an increase of 9.5 percentage points). Over the 
more recent years of its membership, the UK has opted out of the single European currency 
(the Euro) and also the Schengen Treaty, which relaxed border controls in other parts of 
Europe. Although the current leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, supported the 
Remain campaign (but did not in 1975), his support has been seen as lukewarm, potentially 
contributing to its defeat. The majority of his ‘front bench’ team resigned and a vote of no 
confidence against him was supported by 80 per cent of the Labour MPs that voted. A 
leadership challenge has followed. 
 
It was the General Election manifesto published by the Conservative party before the 2015 
election that made a commitment to try and negotiate reform of the EU (“a new settlement”, 
as Cameron described it in 2013), to be followed by an in/out referendum. The concessions 
sought reflected more general public concerns about the free movement of people across 
the EU – and especially their entitlement to welfare payments –, the diminished power of 
nationally elected Governments vis-à-vis the European Parliament and EU-wide legislation, 
and the prospect of further political union across the EU. Such concerns, and the failure to 
ameliorate them, proved decisive in the referendum: a survey undertaken on polling data of 
people who had voted revealed that the main reason why Leave voters had done so were: 
(1) the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK; (2) voting to leave 
offered the best chance for the UK to regain control over immigration and its own borders; 
and (3) remaining meant little or no choice about how the EU expanded its membership or 
powers (Ashcroft, 2016). 
 
Nevertheless, and despite survey polls suggesting either side could win, the vote to leave 
appears to have come as a surprise: on the day of the referendum the pound was riding high 
in the currency markets in the expectation that the UK would remain in the EU. Early into the 
counting the leader of UKIP, Nigel Farage, appeared to concede defeat, saying “Remain will 
edge it.” This proved to be false, and whilst a notably more buoyant Farage was to speak 
later of Britain’s “independence day”, it has also provoked a political and constitutional crisis 
with calls for a second referendum (because the margin of victory was so slim), the question 
of whether Parliament might still vote against leaving (because the referendum is not legally 
binding) and, more especially, the legacy of what appears to be a socially divided country, 
where the result has been interpreted as the reaction of a disenfranchised majority to 
growing inequality, the politics of austerity, and declining real wages and standards of living: 
“for many working-class people, this was a referendum not on the EU but on their quality of 
life” (Mckenzie, 2016). 
 
 
Examining the geography of the Leave vote 
 
The UK Electoral Commission has published the results for each of 382 local authorities 
(LAs) in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland but with Northern Ireland counted 
as a whole and also with the off-shore territory of Gibraltar included as part of the South 
West region.1 Gibraltar is excluded from the analysis presented here because it is an 
                                                 
1 The data are available from http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/file/0014/212135/EU-
referendum-result-data.csv 
exceptional case both in terms of its location and in its support for the EU (95.9 per cent in 
favour of Remain on a turnout of 83.6 per cent, against an overall turnout of 72.2 per cent).2 
For Northern Ireland, the results by each of its eighteen Assembly constituency are available 
from various media outlets including BBC News online. When combined with the Electoral 
Commission data, there are 398 areas (LAs/constituencies) that group into the twelve 
Government Regions of the UK. 
 
Although the standard nomenclature describes them as regions, it should be noted that 
three are actually separate countries with varying levels of devolved power and self-
governance: Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Whereas Remain achieved a majority of 
the votes cast in all of the 32 LAs in Scotland, in 11 of the 18 in Northern Ireland, and in 28 
of the 33 in London, in all remaining regions the Leave campaign won with 64 per cent of the 
LAs/constituencies or more. These percentages are shown in Figure 1. On face value, there 
is strong support for Leave within the West and East Midlands, and much lower support in 
Scotland, London and Northern Ireland. However, the presented values do not take into 
consideration the turnout in each LA/constituency; nor the variation in support within regions, 
at the LA/constituency level. 
 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Another way to examine the results is to look at the share of the total Leave vote that was 
cast in each LA/constituency. If x is the number voting Leave in each location, and X is the 
total voting Leave across all location, then the share of the Leave vote per LA or 
constituency is x/X. These areas are not of equal size so the values are not immediately 
comparable (the share should be bigger in those that contain a larger population). We 
therefore compare x/X with the share of the total electorate per location, which is n/N, where 
n is the number of electorate (voting or otherwise) in each area and N is the total electorate 
across all areas. Where x/X (the observed value, O) is greater than n/N (the expected value, 
E) it means that the LA/constituency is attracting a share of the Leave vote that is greater 
than expected given its electorate size. 
 
The ‘excess’ share of the Leave vote relative to the share of the electorate can be estimated 
as a regression model, where 
 
𝑂
𝐸
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽11 + 𝜀 
(1) 
 
which, when constraining the parameters to be 𝛽0 = 0 and 𝛽1 = 1, gives the regression 
residuals as, 
 
𝜀 = 𝑂
𝐸
− 1 = 𝑂 − 𝐸
𝐸
 
 (2) 
                                                 
2 Its support is heightened because of its relationship with neighbouring Spain which makes a territorial claim on 
Gibraltar. That a relationship could become more fractious outside of the EU. 
 
Multiplying these values by 100 expresses the share of the Leave vote as a percentage 
increase/decrease in the share of the electorate per location. This may seem overly 
convoluted but it can be extended to recognise the multilevel structure whereby LAs nest 
into regions, and to separate out the between region differences (𝜈𝑗) from those that are 
within-regions and between LAs/constituencies (𝜇𝑖𝑗); that is, to estimate, 
 
𝜀 = 𝜈𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 
(3) 
 
using standard multilevel modelling software, here the lme4 library in the open source 
software, R. 
 
The upper part of Figure 2 plots the regional level differences (net of the differences within 
regions) with a 95 per cent confidence interval drawn around each estimate.3 Any value 
above zero means that (at a regional level) the share of the Leave vote was greater than 
expected given the size of the electorate, whereas the reverse is true for a value below zero, 
and, on this basis, the regions are ranked in descending order of the strength of support for 
Leave. There are regional differences: in particular, the share of the Leave vote is, on 
average, 19.7 per cent greater than the share of the electorate in the East Midlands and 
19.3 per cent greater in the West Midlands, and the confidence intervals associated with 
these estimates do not overlap with the estimates for the South East, North West and 
Wales. However, it is London, Scotland and Northern Ireland that most obviously stand apart 
from the rest with their lower-than-expected shares of the Leave vote. Recalling that 
Scotland and Northern Ireland are actually separate countries, the interpretation may be of 
differences within the United Kingdom between nations – the contrast between Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, and England and Wales – and differences within England, notably between 
London and other places but also between the Midlands and some but not all other English 
regions. However, even that is not the whole story because although the ‘regional’ 
differences account for the majority, 54.9 per cent, of the variance in 𝜀, that leaves 45.1 per 
cent at the sub-regional scale. The bottom of Figure 2 adds in those sub-regional differences 
and reveals, for example, that whilst London did, as a whole, have a share of the Leave vote 
that was significantly lower than is expected given the size of its electorate, there are places 
within it where the opposite is true. Similarly, there is variation within the East and West 
Midlands. 
 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Figure 3 focuses on England and Wales, mapping how support for Leave varied across their 
local authorities. It highlights the places where the share of the total Leave vote was greater 
than expected given the share of the electorate found in those local authorities. It also shows 
the places where the share of the Leave vote was less. The latter group consist largely of 
cities and include, in decreasing order of the percentage ‘excess’ towards Remain, much of 
London, Cambridge, Oxford, Brighton, Manchester, Liverpool, Cardiff, Bristol, York, Norwich, 
                                                 
3 The estimates are scaled by the mean average of |𝜀| 
Reading, Nottingham, Leicester, Birmingham, Warwick, Exeter, Cheltenham, Newcastle, 
Winchester, Guildford, Slough, Sheffield, Leeds, Swansea and Bradford. 
 
Using the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs’ 2011 Rural/Urban 
classification, each local authority in England (but not Wales) can be classified into one of 
six types.4 Of the 75 in the Urban with Major Conurbation category (the most urban), 44 per 
cent had a share of the Leave vote that exceeded their share of the electorate; of the 9 
classified as Urban with Minor Conurbation, 78 per cent did; of the 97 classed as Urban with 
City and Town, 80 per cent; of the 54 Urban with Significant Rural, 85 per cent; of the 41 
Largely Rural, 88 per cent; and of the 50 Mainly (and most) Rural, 94 per cent. A chi-square 
test reveals these differences to be statistically significant (𝜒2 = 13.9,𝑝 = 0.016). There is 
therefore evidence of a ‘metropolitan urban’ versus ‘the rest’ divide but not exactly so: of the 
33 Urban with Major Conurbation places where the share of the Leave vote did exceed their 
share of the electorate, six are in London. 
 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Figure 4 considers the difference between the values plotted in Figure 3 and what those 
values would be if they were equal to the regional estimates. In other words, it plots the sub-
regional differences shown in the bottom of Figure 2 – the variations around the regional 
trend. Any place shaded in dark grey to black in this map has a share of the Leave vote that 
is higher than expected given both its share of the electorate and the region within which it is 
located. The influence on Leave’s success of the Eastern coastal regions extending from 
around Norwich, up through the East Midlands and into East Yorkshire is evident, as is the 
eastern and western corners of the South East and South West, respectively, the Welsh 
valleys and parts of the North West. 
 
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
Explaining the geographical variations 
 
Analysis by The Guardian newspaper (The Guardian, 2016) shows that people who have 
attended higher education, have a higher income, are of a higher social grade, are younger, 
or are not born in the UK, are more likely to be living in LAs that had increased propensity to 
vote Remain. In Scotland, devolution and the possibility of Scottish independence are 
important factors, as is the political ideology of the Scottish National Party, which has 
replaced the Labour Party as the opposition to the Conservatism of Westminster. The 
situation is Northern Ireland is complicated by the political history of the recent past and 
perhaps no desire to return to the restricted movement between the Republic of Ireland and 
itself. It, and Scotland, may be more confortable with multiple identities (British, Scottish, 
                                                 
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/2011-rural-urban-classification-of-local-authority-and-other-higher-
level-geographies-for-statistical-purposes 
Irish and/or Northern Irish, European) and are less affected by the issues of immigration 
from the EU that drove much of the rhetoric of the Leave campaign.     
 
Focusing on England and Wales, the models of Equations 1 to 3 can be extended to allow 
for potential predictor variables, 
 
𝑂
𝐸
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽11 + 𝜸𝜸 + 𝜈𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 
 (4) 
 
where 𝜸𝜸 represent the predictor variables and their estimated coefficients (and 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 
are constrained as before). Table 1 reports the results of a model that includes measures of 
the age, ethnicity and socio-economic composition of each LA, for which 2011 Census data 
and the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification are used. It also includes the 
percentage of the population that was born outside the UK but in the EU, and the 
percentage born outside the UK and not in the EU. Finally, the model explores the possibility 
that anti-EU sentiment arises in places that themselves have relatively low levels of 
immigration but share a border with places where the levels are higher: this is measured as 
the percentage of the population born outside of the EU, averaged for each LA’s contiguous 
neighbours (the spatial lag), minus the percentage for the LA itself. 
 
Statistically significant results are highlighted in the table by the strength of the effect size. 
The proportion of the population aged 60 to 64, and the proportion of the population in lower 
supervisory and technical occupations are the most important predictors of an increase vote 
share to Leave. It does not follow that those in this age group or social-economic class are 
necessarily the ones voting Leave but to assume so is consistent with post-referendum 
surveying (Ashcroft, 2016). Others factors are the proportion of the population born outside 
of the UK but in the EU, and the proportion of the population Pakistani. Predictors of a 
decreased vote to Leave include the proportion of the population aged 20 to 25, and the 
population in lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations. They also 
include the proportion of the population of a mixed ethnicity (which implies a more ethnically 
diverse population), the proportion born outside the UK and also outside the EU, and the 
proportion in semi-routine occupations. Such occupations include retail, bar staff and 
waiters, taxi drivers and so forth – that is, they include ‘casual work’ in service sector jobs. 
These suggest that the impact of immigration was complicated upon the Leave vote. 
Combined with knowledge of the geography of the Leave vote, the implication is that 
immigration was a factor towards Leave in what are less ethnically mixed areas along the 
East coast that are nevertheless exposed to seasonal immigration from the EU (in 
agriculture, for example), whereas more ethnically diverse areas, within large towns and 
cities, were less likely to vote Leave. However, areas with higher proportions of Indian, 
Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Black populations were more likely to have a higher-than-
expected share of the Leave vote, albeit not always statistically significantly so. There is 
some evidence that places with neighbours with a higher proportion of the population born 
outside of the UK but within the EU than their own had an increased share of the Leave vote 
but, again, the result is not statistically significant at a conventional level. 
 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
The model explains 67.6 per cent of the variation in the response variable. The unexplained 
variance within regions is one fifth (0.192) of that for a model with no predictor variables; 
between regions it is about one third (0.327). Despite being much reduced, 53.2 per cent of 
the unexplained variance is between regions, 46.8 per cent within. It is, however, London 
that appears to have attracted a share of the Leave vote disproportionately greater than the 
share of the electorate and the model variables predict. But not only London as the regions 
(of England and Wales) appear to divide into three groups: those for where the share of the 
Leave vote is greater than the model predicts (London, West Midlands, East, South East 
and the East Midlands); those for where it is about as predicted (South West, and Yorkshire 
and The Humber); and those for where it is less (North East, North West, and Wales). 
Variations within the regions remain – Figures 5 and 6.   
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Conclusion 
 
In terms of what the EU referendum has revealed, the UK is clearly fragmented with notable 
differences between people and places. There is some truth in a regional reading of the 
referendum results whereby London, which stands apart socially, economically and 
ethnically with a culturally diverse and diversifying population that is unusual for the UK 
(Ganesh, 2015), also stands apart from especially the East Midlands, West Midlands, the 
East, and Yorkshire and The Humber in terms of its (decreased) support for Leave. 
However, the splits are not as simple as they have sometimes been portrayed: there is 
variation within regions, with notable differences between large cities and towns (that 
attracted a smaller share of the Leave vote), and smaller towns and rural regions (a higher 
share). Although attention has been drawn to the Midlands and the East Coast regions in 
their support for Leave, parts of the South East (amongst others) were also influential. And 
whilst within England and Wales, much of the differences can be explained by the social, 
ethnic and demographic composition of the places, some attained a share of the Leave vote 
higher than predicted: the Midlands, East and South East but also London, in which the 
Remain campaign did not make the gains it had hoped for, providing one reason for why it 
lost the vote. 
 
On top of these regional and sub-regional differences are the national differences, notably 
between Scotland and Northern Ireland and much of England and Wales. It has been said 
that, “metropolitan liberals have allied with Scotland against small-town England” (Rentoul, 
2016), although this is to ignore the way much of Northern Ireland voted, the variations in 
London, and also that if there was a sense of ‘ganging-up’ then it was by a large group of 
politically disenfranchised, largely (but not exclusively) white and broadly working class 
voters in areas of England and Wales that have seen a decline in industrial and 
manufacturing jobs, as well in stable employment, aligning with an older population to vote 
against the ‘metropolitan liberals’ and the EU. This alignment also does not fall neatly along 
traditional political lines. Although there is considerable concern in the Labour party that it 
has lost touch with its core voter and may be wiped out in England and Wales (as it has 
largely been in Scotland), one reason the referendum was held was because of 
Conservative concerns that it was losing its voters to UKIP. There is some evidence to 
support an economic interpretation of the referendum: aggregating the results up into the 
larger statistical regions for which estimates of the regional GDP are available, there is a 
relationship between decreasing per capita GDP and a greater percentage of the vote being 
for Leave. 
 
Ultimately the story is perhaps less about the EU itself but one of industrial decline and 
growing social and economic inequality, overlapping with nationalism and political beliefs 
that play out very differently in Scotland (and also Northern Ireland) than they do in England 
and Wales. How an ‘independent’ UK (potentially without Scotland and with devolved power 
to the Northern Irish Assembly) that is dominated by London both as an engine of growth 
and a place of increasing ethno-cultural diversity can accommodate such deep and on-going 
divisions is not, at the present time, clear and may suggest a United Kingdom in name only.  
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Estimate se t value  
Age: 
 
 
Proportion of the LA aged 20 to 25 -1.702 0.366 -4.648 * 
Proportion of the LA aged 25 to 29 -1.224 0.826 -1.481  
Proportion of the LA aged 30 to 44 -0.837 0.595 -1.408  
Proportion of the LA aged 45 to 59 -0.840 0.646 -1.302  
Proportion of the LA aged 60 to 64 3.728 1.818 2.051 * 
Proportion of the LA aged 65 to 74 0.817 1.322 0.618  
Proportion of the LA aged 75 to 84 -1.474 1.764 -0.836  
Proportion of the LA aged 85 to 89 5.427 5.167 1.050  
Proportion of the LA aged 90 or above -8.594 6.075 -1.415  
Ethnicity:     
log(1 – proportion of the LA population White) -0.001 0.004 -0.271  
log(proportion of the LA population Indian) 0.015 0.008 1.932  
log(proportion of the LA population Pakistani) 0.011 0.004 2.908 * 
log(proportion of the LA population Bangladeshi) 0.005 0.004 1.420  
log(proportion of the LA population Black) 0.013 0.010 1.294  
log(proportion of the LA population Mixed ethnicity) -0.079 0.022 -3.529 * 
Socio-economic class:     
Proportion in Higher managerial, administrative & professional 
occupations 
-0.705 0.394 -1.790 
 
Proportion in Lower managerial, administrative & professional 
occupations 
-1.329 0.524 -2.537 * 
Proportion in Intermediate occupations 2.969 0.353 8.403 * 
Proportion in Lower supervisory and technical occupations 3.459 0.836 4.140 * 
Proportion in Semi-routine occupations -1.121 0.562 -1.994 * 
Proportion in Routine occupations 0.772 0.426 1.814  
Proportion in Never worked and long-term unemployed -0.570 0.445 -1.281  
Immigration:     
(a) Proportion of residents born outside UK but in the EU 2.169 0.669 3.242 * 
(b) Proportion of residents born outside UK and outside the EU -0.625 0.286 -2.190 * 
Spatial lag of (a) minus (a) 0.753 0.578 1.304  
Spatial lag of (b) minus (b) -0.017 0.199 -0.084  
 
Table 1. Showing the fixed effects estimates for a multilevel modelling predicting the ‘excess’ 
share of the Leave vote as a percentage increase/decrease of the share of the electorate for 
Local Authorities in England and Wales. * = |t| < 0.05 (≅ 95% confidence); rows are shaded 
by the strength of the effect size  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The percentage of local authorities (LAs) or Northern Ireland constituencies ‘won’ 
by the Leave campaign in each of the 12 UK regions. The width of the bars is proportional to 
the number of LAs/constituencies the region contains     
 
 
  
  
 
Figure 2. Caterpillar plots showing the modelled variations between regions in terms of their 
observed and expected share of the Leave votes, net of the variations within regions. The 
percentage differences are the percentage increase/decrease in the share of the Leave vote 
relative to the share of the electorate. The bottom plot includes the sub-regional variations, 
at the local authority/Northern Ireland constituency scale. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3. Showing where the share of the Leave vote was higher or lower than the share of 
the electorate (and shaded by the share of the Leave vote as a percentage 
increase/decrease in the share of the electorate) 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4. Showing where the share of the Leave vote was higher or lower than expected 
given the regional support for Leave 
  
  
 
Figure 5. Caterpillar plots showing the residuals variations between and within regions in 
terms of their observed and expected share of the Leave votes, net of the socio-economic, 
demographic and ethnic composition of the local authorities they contain. 
 
  
  
 
Figure 6. Showing where the share of the Leave vote was higher or lower than expected 
given the model prediction. 
